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SUBJECT: NATO EXPERT WORKING GROUP ON AFRICA

REF: USNATO 818

1. AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TELEGRAM, THERE FOLLOWS
THE DEPARTMENT'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE REPORT OF THE
EXPERTS ON AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA. TEXT IS BASED ON
SUGGESTED OUTLINE REFTEL.

2.I.ANGOLA: THE CIVIL WAR

A. THE MOVEMENTS AND THEIR FOREIGN SUPPORTERS
MPLA. THE MPLA WAS FOUNDED IN 1956 WITH THE AID OF THE
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SMALL ANGOLAN BRANCH OF THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY

(PCP). AGOSTINHO NETO, WHO BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH THE PCP WHILE STUDYING MEDICINE IN PORTUGAL, RETURNED TO ANGOLA IN 1958 AND BECAME MPLA PRESIDENT IN 1962 FOLLOWING A BRIEF PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT AND EXILE. HIS PCP CONNECTIONS ENABLED HIM TO OBTAIN FINANCIAL AND MILITARY BACKING FROM THE USSR, AND THE MPLA'S ASSOCIATION WITH COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS TENDED TO REINFORCE ITS IDENTIFICATION WITH MOSCOW. ALTHOUGH IT MAINTAINED OCCASIONAL CONTACT WITH PEKING --

NEVER A MAJOR RECIPIENT OF CHINESE SUPPORT. THE MPLA DID, HOWEVER, RECEIVE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA AND FROM SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS.

3. DESPITE ITS CLAIMS OF BEING A BROADLY-BASED NATIONALIST MOVEMENT, THE MPLA IS A MINORITY PARTY AND IS LIKELY TO REMAIN SO. ITS MAIN SUPPORT COMES FROM ANGOLA'S ESTIMATED 1.5 MILLION KIMBUNDU, BUT EVEN HERE THE DEPT OF ITS POPULARITY IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE. MOREOVER, THE MPLA LEADERSHIP -- PREDOMINANTLY URBAN, INTELLECTUAL AND MIDDLE CLASS, AND WITH A VISIBLE WHITE AND MESTICO PRESENCE -- CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH ANGOLA'S LARGELY BLACK AND RURAL POPULATION. THE MPLA HAS A LONG HISTORY OF INTERNAL DIVISIVENESS STEMMING FROM IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES, RACIAL CLEAVAGES AND PERSONALITY CONFLICTS, AND THESE COULD BE ACCENTUATED IN THE FUTURE BY NEW PROBLEMS AND PRESSURES ON THE MOVEMENT.

4. FNLA. FORMED IN 1962 BY THE MERGER OF TWO BAKONGO TRIBAL GROUPS, THE FNLA WAS NEVER ABLE TO ESTABLISH A BROAD NATIONAL CONSTITUENCY. IT CAME CLOSEST TO ACQUIRING THAT REPUTATION IN 1963 WHEN THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY RECOGNIZED ITS REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA IN EXILE (GRAE). EVEN BEFORE THAT RECOGNITION WAS FORMALLY WITHDRAWN IN 1971, THE FNLA HAD LOST ITS PRE-EMINENT POSITION TO THE MPLA, WHICH BECAME THE MAJOR RECIPIENT OF OAU FUNDS BEGINNING IN THE MID 1960'S.

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5. OVER TIME, HOLDEN ROBERTO'S HIGHLY PERSONALIZED LEADERSHIP STYLE AND HIS INTENSE SUSPICION OF POTENTIAL RIVALS NOT ONLY WEAKENED THE FNLA ORGANIZATION BUT ALSO ALIENATED REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER TRIBAL GROUPS -- SUCH AS JONAS SAVIMBI -- WHOSE PARTICIPATION IN THE FRONTCOULD HAVE GIVEN IT BROADER NATIONAL APPEAL. AS A RESULT, FNLA'S SUPPORT HAS BEEN LIMITED TO TH

ESTIMATED 500,000 BAKONGO IN NORTHERN ANGOLA, AND TO THE ADDITIONAL 500,000 TO 1 MILLION ANGOLAN BAKONGO WHO HAVE TAKEN REFUGE IN ZAIRE SINCE 1961.

6. ZAIRE HAS BEEN THE PRINCIPAL BACKER OF THE FNLA SINCE ITS INCEPTION. AN AVOWED ANTI-COMMUNIST, ROBERTO DID NOT ACTIVELY SEEK COMMUNIST ASSISTANCE UNTIL DECEMBER 1973 WHEN MOBUTU ARRANGED FOR HIM TO VISIT PEKING. IN THE INTEREST OF IMPROVING THEIR RELATIONS

AN MPLA DELEGATION LAST VISITED IN JUNE 1975 -- IT WAS WITH ZAIRE, THE CHINESE AGREED TO TRAIN AND EQUIP FNLA INSURGENTS IN ZAIRE. THE FIRST CONTINGENT OF CHINESE INSTRUCTORS ARRIVED IN MAY 1974, AND THE LAST WAS WITHDRAWN IN OCTOBER 1975 AFTER PEKING SIGNALLED ITS INTENTION TO DISENGAGE FROM ANGOLA'S CIVIL WAR.

7. IT WAS LARGELY BECAUSE OF PEKING'S ASSISTANCE THAT THE FNLA CAME TO BE REGARDED IN EARLY 1975 AS THE STRONGEST OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. BUT CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE MPLA QUICKLY REVEALED THE FNLA'S ORGANIZATIONAL WEAKNESSES AND LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT. THE FNLA STILL HAS A STRONG CLAIM ON BAKONGO LOYALTIES, BUT THE MPLA WILL UNDOUBTEDLY EXPLOIT HISTORICAL INTRA-TRIBAL CLEAVAGES IN ATTEMPTING TO ERODE THE FNLA'S SUPPORT.

8. UNITA. UNITA WAS FORMED IN 1966, AFTER JONAS SAVIMBI -- A SWISS-EDUCATED DOCTOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE -- HAD BROKEN WITH ROBERTO IN 1964. UNLIKE HIS RIVALS, SAVIMBI ESTABLISHED HIS HEADQUARTERS INSIDE ANGOLA WHERE HE ORGANIZED SUPPORT AMONG THE 2.5 MILLION OVIMBUNDU WHO INHABIT THE FERTILE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS.

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9. BECAUSE OF HIS ESPOUSAL OF CHINESE INSURGENCY TACTICS SAVIMBI WAS EARLY LABELED A "MAOIST"; BUT IN FACT UNITA RECEIVED ONLY LIMITED AND SPORADIC SUPPORT FROM PEKING. INDEED, UNITA WAS NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE OAU UNTIL LATE 1974, AND IT ONLY ACQUIRED SIGNIFICANT BACKING FROM ZAIRE AND ZAMBIA IN MID-1975 AFTER IT ALLIED WITH THE FNLA. SUBSEQUENTLY, SAVIMBI'S CAREFULLY CULTIVATED IMAGE AS A MODERATE AFRICAN SOCIALIST WON HIM INCREASING SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT AMONG AFRICAN MODERATES, IN WESTERN CAPITALS, AND EVENTUALLY IN PRETORIA.

10. SAVIMBI APPEARS TO HAVE STRONG POPULAR SUPPORT AMONG THE OVIMBUNDU AND RELATED EASTERN AND SOUTHERN TRIBES, WHICH HE CLAIMS WILL ENABLE HIM TO WAGE AN EFFECTIVE INSURGENCY AGAINST THE MPLA. NEVERTHELESS,

HIS REPUTATION AND APPEAL HAVE PROBABLY SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF HIS ASSOCIATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND UNITA'S MILITARY DEFEAT.

11.B.THE MILITARY SITUATION

HAVING WON THE CONVENTIONAL WAR, THE MPLA MAY NOW FIND THAT IT HAS INHERITED AN INSURGENCY SITUATION WHICH BEARS AT LEAST SOME RESEMBLANCE TO THAT FACED BY PORTUGAL DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD -- ONE THAT CAN BE CONTAINED BUT NOT SUPPRESSED ALTOGETHER. UNITA IN PARTICULAR

PROBABLY HAS A LARGER AND BETTER EQUIPPED FORCE THAN IT DID BEFORE, AND MAY EVEN BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO WAGE AN INSURGENT STRUGGLE THAN IT WAS DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD. EVEN WITH THE BACKING OF THE ESTIMATED 12,000 CUBAN TROOPS NOW IN ANGOLA, THE MPLA ARMY -- WHICH PROBABLY NUMBERS NO MORE THAN 30,000 AT PRESENT -- WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY CONTROLLING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY, THUS GIVING FNLA AND UNITA AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH RELATIVELY SECURE SANCTUARIES IN REMOTE AREAS.

12. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO JUDGE HOW SUCCESSFUL FNLA AND UNITA WILL BE IN REVERTING TO GUERRILLA TACTICS. BOTH WILL FACE SERIOUS ORGANIZATIONAL AND MORALE PROBLEMS; AND IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT ROBERTO AND SAVIMBI WILL BE ABLE TO RETAIN EITHER THEIR
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LEADERSHIP POSITIONS OR THEIR POPULAR APPEAL WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TRIBAL BASES.

13. C. PROSPECTS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD DEMONSTRATED CONCLUSIVELY THAT THE THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WERE UNABLE TO WORK TOGETHER. THE MPLA -- PERHAPS NOT ALONE -- NEVER REALLY ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF SHARED POLITICAL POWER, AND ONLY UNDER THE THREAT OF BEING EXCLUDED FROM AN INDEPENDENCE SETTLEMENT DID IT FINALLY CONSENT TO SIGN THE ALVOR AGREEMENT IN JANUARY 1975. ONCE IN LUANDA, IT ADOPTED A STRATEGY OF FORCING ITS RIVALS OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ULTIMATELY OUT OF EXISTENCE. IT HAS RECENTLY DECREED THAT HENCEFORTH BOTH ORGANIZATIONS WILL BE BANNED FROM THE COUNTRY.

14. NEITHER THE THREAT OF CONTINUED MILITARY ACTION NOR OUTSIDE PRESSURES IS LIKELY TO FORCE THE MPLA TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO FNLA AND UNITA. EVEN IF THE MPLA'S ATTITUDE WERE TO CHANGE, IT WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR COMPROMISE. IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT THE MPLA

WERE TO MAKE CONCILIATORY GESTURES TO ROBERTO AND SAVIMBI, BOTH WOULD PROBABLY REACT WITH EXTREME SUSPICION IN VIEW OF THEIR PAST EXPERIENCE.

15. NEVERTHELESS, THE MPLA PROBABLY IS PREPARED TO ADOPT A SOMEWHAT MORE CONCILIATORY ATTITUDE TOWARD FORMER FNLA AND UNITA SYMPATHIZERS AND MAY EVEN APPOINT SOME FORMER FNLA AND UNITA OFFICIALS TO HIGHLY VISIBLE BUT LARGELY CEREMONIAL POSITIONS AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. IN SO DOING IT WOULD HOPE NOT ONLY TO UNDERMINE THE POPULAR APPEAL OF ROBERTO AND SAVIMBI AND

THEREBY MINIMIZE THE THREAT OF DOMESTIC DISSIDENCE, BUT ALSO TO APPEASE THOSE OUTSIDERS WHO HAVE URGED THE REGIME TO FOSTER NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

16. II. THE ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE CRISIS
A. REASONS FOR AND SCALE OF ITS INTERVENTION
AT THE OUTSET SOUTH AFRICA, IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS
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REGIONAL DETENTE POLICYALMOST CERTAINLY ENVISAGED RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA SIMILAR TO THOSE IT HAD OPTED FOR WITH MOZAMBIQUE, I.E., MINIMAL FORMAL RELATIONS SUPPLEMENTED BY INFORMAL CHANNELS TO DEAL WITH MUTUAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES AND CONCERNS. THE POSITION OF NAMIBIA AS A BUFFER BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA PRESUMABLY FACILITATED THE DECISION TO ACCEPT A BLACK NATIONALIST REGIME IN ANGOLA AND ENCOURAGED THE ANTICIPATION OF RELATIVELY TROUBLE-FREE RELATIONS. THE EXPECTATION THAT THE SOUTHERN PART OF ANGOLA WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY THE RELATIVELY MODERATE UNITA ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO SOUTH AFRICA'S SENSE OF SECURITY.

17. THE ADVANCE OF SOVIET-BACKED MPLA FORCES IN SEPTEMBER 1975 TO PEREIRA D'ECA, WITHIN 25 MILES OF THE NAMIBIAN BORDER -- MUCH FURTHER SOUTH THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED -- ALARMED THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DEBATE, A DECISION WAS MADE TO INTERVENE WITH MILITARY FORCES, FIRST TO EJECT THE MPLA FROM SOUTHERN ANGOLA AND LATER IN SUPPORT OF EFFORTS BY FNLA AND UNITA TO CAPTURE LUANDA AND THE CITIES ALONG THE BENGUELA RAILROAD.

18. EVEN WITH SOUTH AFRICAN HELP, HOWEVER, FNLA AND UNITA FORCES CONFRONTED BY INCREASING NUMBERS OF CUBAN TROOPS WERE STOPPED, AND THEN PUSHED BACK. IN LATE JANUARY 1976, FOLLOWING US (AND OTHER) CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA AND DESPITE THE OAU'S FAILURE TO FORMALLY CONDEMN SOUTH

AFRICAN INTERVENTION, THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES BEGAN TO WITHDRAW. THEY EVENTUALLY MOVED TO STRONG POINTS FROM 25 TO 100 MILES NORTH OF THE NAMIBIAN BORDER. AT SOME POINTS THEY APPARENTLY INTEND TO REMAIN ONLY TEMPORARILY, TO GUARD THE CAMPS OF PORTUGUESE AND ANGOLAN REFUGEES WHO FLED BEFORE THE MPLA ADVANCE. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER, OF ANY PLANS TO WITHDRAW FROM THEIR OCCUPATION OF THE JOINTLY-OWNED CUNENE RIVER HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT, WHICH PROVIDE POWER AND IRRIGATION WATER TO BOTH ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA.

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19. IN DECIDING TO INTERVENE, THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE MOTIVATED BY CONCERN OVER ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET-INFLUENCED REGIME OVER WHICH THEY WOULD HAVE LITTLE LEVERAGE AND BY FEAR OF AN IMMINENT THREAT TO THE NAMIBIAN BORDER, THE LINE VORSTER HAD COMMITTED HIMSELF TO DEFEND IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM SUPPORT OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN RHODESIA AND NOT TO INTERVENE AGAINST FRELIMO IN MOZAMBIQUE. PRETORIA MAY HAVE RECEIVED TACIT OR EXPLICIT ENCOURAGEMENT FROM SOME AFRICAN LEADERS, DEEPLY CONCERNED THEMSELVES ABOUT THE ESCALATING AMOUNT OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE AND THE UNPRECEDENTED PARTICIPATION OF CUBAN COMBAT TROOPS. THE SOUTH AFRICANS MAY ALSO HAVE BELIEVED THAT THEIR INTERVENTION WOULD RECEIVE SUPPORT FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES IN VIEW OF THE PRESENCE OF SIZABLE CUBAN FORCES AND SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN ANGOLA.

20. B. CONSEQUENCES OF THE ANGOLAN CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S DOMESTIC POLICY.

AS THE SCOPE OF SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION, THE DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL REACTION AND THE QUESTIONABLE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OPERATION BEGAN TO BE UNDERSTOOD BY SOUTH AFRICANS, DOMESTIC OPPOSITION SURFACE AMONG SEVERAL DIVERGENT GROUPS:

--SUPPORTERS OF DETENTE WITHIN THE RULING NATIONAL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP, WHO FEARED THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO THE POLICY;

--THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE PRESS, HABITUAL CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT;

--MILITARY LEADERS, AT FIRST ENTHUSIASTIC, WHO WERE REPORTEDLY DISTRESSED AT THE POOR SHOWING OF YOUNG RESERVISTS AGAINST AN ENEMY WHOSE STRENGTH THEY HAD UNDERESTIMATED;

--THE FAMILIES OF THE YOUNG RESERVISTS WHO OBJECTED

TO THEIR BEING SENT INTO BATTLE.

21. THE GOVERNMENT IS PRESUMABLY STILL ASSESSING THE COSTS AND LESSONS OF ITS ANGOLAN ADVENTURE, AND THE FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF ITS POLICY. VORSTER'S FREEDOM OF CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION HAS PROBABLY BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED; RIGHT-WING CRITICISM, TO WHICH HE IS ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE, MAY CAUSE HIM TO GO SLOW IN RESUMING THE INITIATIVE ON DETENTE OR EVEN, CONCEIVABLY, TO RECONSIDER HIS REFUSAL TO SUPPORT SMITH IN RHODESIA. THE TENDENCY TO EQUATE BLACK AFRICA WITH "COMMUNISM" WILL GET A PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST.

22. THE DEBACLE IN ANGOLA HAS PROBABLY REINFORCED THE SOUTH AFRICANS' SENSE OF ISOLATION AND BELEAGUERMENT, AND THEIR BITTERNESS AGAINST THE WEST FOR REFUSING TO COME TO THEIR AID IN WHAT THEY SEE AS THEIR DEFENSE OF A COMMON INTEREST.

23. AS FOR THE HIGHLY-PUBLICIZED REFORMS IN DOMESTIC POLICY -- I.E., REDUCTION OF SOME ASPECTS OF "PETTY APARTHEID" -- THERE MAY BE SOME PUBLIC OBJECTION TO FURTHER FORWARD MOVEMENT, BUT SINCE THESE REFORMS HAVE BEEN MOSTLY WINDOW DRESSING WITH LITTLE EFFECT ON THE SUBSTANCE APARTHEID, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE LITTLE CHANGE IN ANY CASE.

24. THE IMPACT ON SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS. THERE MAY BE INCREASED AWARENESS ON THEIR PART OF THE INCREASED FREEDOM OF THEIR NEAR NEIGHBORS AND SOME BITTER SATISFACTION AT THE PERCEIVED DEFEAT OF THE POWERFUL SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCES. BUT IF THIS AWARENESS SHOULD LEAD TO ANY ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE RESISTANCE OR POLITICAL ACTION, IT WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE MET WITH IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE REPRESSION.

25. C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM
AS IN OTHER POLICY AREAS, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANGOLAN VENTURE FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S PROGRAM FOR NAMIBIA ARE PROBABLY STILL BEING ASSESSED IN PRETORIA. VORSTER HAS GIVEN NO VISIBLE INDICATION OF RECOGNIZING A NEED FOR CHANGE, AS EARLIER HE HAD FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE BASIC UNACCEPTABILITY IN AFRICAN EYES OF HIS PROGRAM FOR NAMIBIAN "SELF-DETERMINATION.

26. A REASSESSMENT COULD CONCEIVABLY LEAD TO A
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DECISION TO SPEED UP THE TIMETABLE FOR NAMIBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS, TO PERMIT SWAPO TO PARTICIPATE AND/OR TO INVITE UN SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS AS THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS URGED. CONVERSELY, IT MAY LEAD TO A SLOW-DOWN OF THE PROJECTED SCHEDULE, WITH PROLONGED DELAYS BETWEEN SESSIONS OF THE TALKS, AND EXTENSIONS OF THE SO-FAR UNDEFINED TRANSITION PERIOD.

27. LESS LIKELY IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT DISILLUSIONMENT MIGHT BE STRONG ENOUGH TO BRING ABOUT A DECISION TO ABANDON SOUTHWEST AFRICA, TO REPATRIATE THE MORE THAN 90,000 WHITES, AND TO GIVE INDEPENDENCE TO THE VARIOUS INCIPIENT HOMELANDS, LEAVING A BALKANIZED NAMIBIA TO FEND FOR ITSELF. THE WIDESPREAD INSTABILITY

WHICH WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY RESULT AND THE STRONG SOUTH AFRICAN COMMITMENT IN THE TERRITORY ARGUE AGAINST THIS OPTION, HOWEVER.

28. MUCH HINGES ON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE MPLA AND THEIR SOVIET AND CUBAN ALLIES TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA. IF THEY FOREGO THE TEMPTATION TO INVADE NAMIBIA OR TO PROVOKE BORDER CONFRONTATIONS, AND TO LIMIT THEIR SUPPORT TO SWAPO TO THE PROVISION OF SANCTUARY AND TRAINING OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY, A MODUS VIVENDI MAY YET BE REACHED. IF THEY DO NOT, THE UN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WHETHER A "THREAT TO THE PEACE" EXISTS IN THE AREA MAY BECOME ACADEMIC.

29. D. IMPLICATIONS FOR RHODESIA
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA HAD TWO POSSIBLE LESSONS FOR RHODESIA:
--SOUTH AFRICA WAS SEEN TO HAVE TRIED TO "SHAPE" REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS WHEN A COMMUNIST PRESENCE APPEARED TO THREATEN IT.
--BUT IT WOULD NOT "GO IT ALONE" BEYOND ITS OWN BORDERS WHEN INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES E.G., STRONG AFRICAN REACTION AND WESTERN INACTION OR DISAPPROVAL WERE UNFAVORABLE.

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30. SOME RHODESIANS WILL ANTICIPATE THAT, WHEN THE CHIPS ARE DOWN, SOUTH AFRICA WILL DECIDE THAT IT HAS MORE AT STAKE IN RHODESIA -- I.E., RACIAL KINSHIP WITH THE

RULING WHITES -- THAN IT HAD WITH THE BLACK GROUPS
IT ALLIED ITSELF WITH IN ANGOLA. THIS APPEARS TO BE
THE APPROACH THE SMITH REGIME IS TAKING AS IT SEEKS TO
MANIPULATE SOUTH AFRICAN OPINION IN FAVOR OF SUPPORTING
RHODESIA AGAINST THE THREAT OF RENEWED AND INTENSIFIED
INSURGENCY.

31. ON THE OTHER HAND, SOUTH AFRICA CONTINUES TO TELL
THE RHODESIANS THAT IT FAVORS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
WITH THE BLACK NATIONALISTS; AND THAT IT WILL NOT P
PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT GUERRILLA WAR-
FARE. ON THE BASIS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL
FROM ANGOLA AND ITS OSTENSIBLE DEFEAT BY SOVIET-
BACKED CUBANS AND THE MPLA, OTHER RHODESIANS PRESUMABLY
WILL CONCLUDE THAT PRETORIA WILL NOT AGAIN EMPLOY ITS
ARMED FORCES OUTSIDE ITS OWN BORDERS UNLESS ITS OWN
TERRITORIAL SECURITY IS THREATENED.

32. E. EVOLUTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS WITH OTHER
AFRICAN COUNTRIES
UNTIL SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERVENTION IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL
WAR, IT HAD MOVED SLOWLY BUT SURELY TO BREACH THE SOLID
RANKS OF AFRICAN HOSTILITY TO IT BY A POLICY OF
SELECTIVE "DIALOGUES" WITH RELATIVELY MODERATE STATES,
E.G., IVORY COAST, LIBERIA, MALAWI. AT THE SAME TIME,
IT SOUGHT TO COME TO TERMS WITH SOME OF ITS NEIGHBORS,
WHOSE ABHORRENCE OF APARTHEID WAS MORE STRONGLY FELT,
THROUGH THE "DETENTE" POLICY. IT HAS PUSHED THIS
APPROACH MORE URGENTLY SINCE THE 1974 COUP IN PORTUGAL
BY 1) SEEKING GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE RADICAL FRELIMO
REGIME IN MOZAMBIQUE; 2) CEASING MILITARY SUPPORT OF
THE SMITH REGIME IN RHODESIA AND PRESSING IT TO
NEGOTIATE WITH BLACK NATIONALISTS; AND 3) STARTING
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCUSSIONS AIMED AT PRODUCING A SELF-
GOVERNING NAMIBIA. BUT THE CIVIL WAR AND GROWING SOVIET
INFLUENCE IN ANGOLA OVERRODE CONSIDERATIONS OF
DETENTE POLICY SINCE THEY WERE SEEN IN PRETORIA AS
POSING AN IMMEIDATE THREAT.
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33. WHILE HALF THE MEMBERS OF THE OAU SUMMIT IN JANUARY
APPEARED TO CONSIDER SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION NO
WORSE THAN THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA, VIRTUALLY
NONE CONDONED IT. AND AS AN MPLA VICTORY BECAME
IMMINENT, THOSE STATES THAT HAD COOPERATED WITH SOUTH
AFRICA IN ITS ANGOLAN ROLE NO LONGER WISHED TO APPEAR
TOO CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH IT.

34. AS A RESULT, SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICIES OF DIALOGUE

AND DETENTE ARE, AT BEST, STALLED, AND MAY HAVE BEEN IRRETRIEVABLY UNDERMINED. MOREOVER, SOVIET-SUPPORTED CUBAN AND MPLA TROOPS FACE -- ALTHOUGH FROM A DISTANCE AT THE MOMENT -- SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AT THE CUNENE DAM IN ANGOLA AND ALONG THE NAMIBIAN BORDER. IN THE EAST, THERE ARE REPORTS THAT MOZAMBIQUE MAY BE RECEIVING SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR THE RHODESIAN INSURGENTS.

35. SOUTH AFRICA MAY THEREFORE BE PLACING SOMEWHAT LESS EMPHASIS ON EFFORTS TO BREAK OUT OF ITS ISOLATION IN AFRICA TO PREPARATIONS TO WITHSTAND A LONG SEIGE.

IN SOME RESPECTS, THIS IS A GLOOMY PROSPECT:

--ITS CORDON SANITAIRE AGAINST BLACK INSURGENCIES IS CRUMBLING;

--IT BELIEVES ITSELF TO HAVE BEEN ABANDONED BY THE WEST IN ANGOLA;

--IT SENSES BOTH AN IMPLACABLY HOSTILE BLACK AFRICA AND ITS OWN ISOLATION;

--IT SEES THE SOVIETS, CUBANS AND CHINESE INGRATIATE THEMSELVES WITH MORE AND MORE AFRICAN NATIONS OWING TO MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS.

III. INFLUENCE OF NON-AFRICAN POWERS

A. SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION

36. SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA WAS DESIGNED FROM THE OUTSET TO TILT THE OUTCOME OF THE CRISIS IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIETS' CHOSEN CLIENT, THE MPLA. MOSCOW
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RENEWED ITS MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE MPLA SHORTLY AFTER THE PORTUGUESE COUP IN APRIL 1974, BUT THIS ASSISTANCE REMAINED AT MODERATE LEVELS UNTIL THE DATE FOR INDEPENDENCE BECAME KNOWN. THEN, FACED WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE MPLA COULD GAIN A DOMINANT ROLE IN ANGOLA ONLY IF ITS RIVALS WERE CONSTRAINED AND SUBDUED MILITARILY, MOSCOW STEPPED UP ITS AID. AS INDEPENDENCE DREW CLOSER AND MPLA'S MILITARY FORTUNES PLUMMETED, SOVIET ASSISTANCE (INCLUDING THE AIRLIFT OF MILITARY SUPPLIES) ESCALATED SHARPLY AND CUBAN INTERVENTION BEGAN IN EARNEST.

37. MOSCOW, CHARACTERISTICALLY HAS DENIED ANY SELF-INTEREST IN SUPPORTING THE MPLA, CONTENDING MERELY THAT ALL "SOCIALIST" POWERS ARE DUTY BOUND TO SUPPORT THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE USSR ALSO SOUGHT:

--ESTABLISHMENT OF A LEFTIST OR "PROGRESSIVE" STYLE
REGIME IN LUANDA;

--ENHANCEMENT OF SOVIET CREDIBILITY AND INFLUENCE WITH
OTHER CLIENTS IN THE REGION; AND

--CREATION OF AN ANTI-SOUTH AFRICAN-RHODESIAN
POLARIZATION THAT WOULD ENHANCE SOVIET ENTREE IN
BLACK AFRICA IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

38. FURTHERMORE, MOSCOW HAS UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN MOTIVATED
BY A DESIRE:

--TO DIMINISH CHINESE INFLUENCE WITH THE REGION'S
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS;

--TO DEMONSTRATE MOSCOW'S CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO
THE CAUSE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION DESPITE DETENTE;
AND

--TO OBTAIN AN OPTION ON WHATEVER ECONOMIC POTENTIAL
ANGOLA HAS TO OFFER.

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B. SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

39. MOSCOW'S INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA HAS BEEN CONSISTENT
WITH THE GENERAL SOVIET POLICY OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA.
FROM THE BEGINNING THESE OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY
COHERENT AND, TO A MARKED DEGREE CONSISTENT. IN BROAD
TERMS MOSCOW HAS SOUGHT TO ACHIEVE:

--EXPANSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE AREA;

--CONTAINMENT AND, WHEREVER POSSIBLE, DIMINUTION OF
WESTERN AND CHINESE INFLUENCE AMONG THE EMERGING
AFRICAN STATES;

--AFRICAN BACKING FOR POSITIONS ON INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ISSUES CONSONANT WITH BROAD SOVIET FOREIGN
POLICY OBJECTIVES;

--AFRICAN ADOPTION OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS BASED ON
"NON-CAPITALIST" PRINCIPLES; AND

--THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RELATIONSHIP WITH CERTAIN
AFRICAN STATES THAT WOULD PROVIDE THE USSR WITH
ACCESS TO MILITARY FACILITIES TO SUPPORT ITS EXPAND-

ING GLOBAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY ROLE.

40. IN PURSUIT OF THEIR BROAD POLICY GOALS, THE SOVIETS HAVE RELIED ON A MIXTURE OF TRADITIONAL MEANS TO GAIN INFLUENCE WITH AFRICAN STATES--MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL AID, AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND FOR AFRICAN POSITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS. PRIOR TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS FOR THE PREVIOUS TEN YEARS HAD MAINTAINED A LOW PROFILE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA.

41. IN GENERAL TERMS, MOSCOW'S TWO DECADES OF EFFORT HAVE PRODUCED ONLY LIMITED RESULTS:

--WESTERN INFLUENCE HAS DECLINED, BUT CHINESE INFLUENCE HAS TO A CERTAIN EXTENT GROWN IN SOME AREAS;

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--AFRICAN STATES HAVE SHUNNED THE ORTHODOX MARXIST-LENINIST APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT;

--SOVIET INFLUENCE IS SIGNIFICANT IN A RESTRICTED NUMBER OF CLIENT STATES, BUT IN THE VAST MAJORITY OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES IT IS SUBORDINATE TO CONSIDERATIONS OF NATIONALISM AND INDEPENDENCE;

--THE USSR HAS GAINED RELATIVELY FREE ACCESS FOR ITS NAVAL AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT ONLY IN SOMALIA AND GUINEA.

42. NEVERTHELESS, THE ANGOLAN EXPERIENCE WITH ITS APPRECIABLE SUCCESS AND RELATIVELY LOW COST IN TERMS OF OTHER POLICY PRIORITIES, MAY NOW HAVE CONVINCED MOSCOW THAT THE CURRENT CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA OFFERS CONTINUED POSSIBILITIES FOR ADVANCING THE SOVIET GOALS. BREZHNEV'S STRONG SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN AFRICA AT THE 25TH CPSU CONGRESS, INDEED, SUGGESTS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE PROBABLY CONCLUDED THAT ITS "VICTORY" IN ANGOLA HOLDS IMPORTANT PROMISE FOR FACILITATING AND EXPANDING SOVIET ENTREE IN THE BLACK AFRICAN STATES ON THE BASIS OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR BLACK AFRICAN PRESSURE AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA.

C. CHINESE REACTION TO SOVIET-CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA

43. THE CHINESE REALIZED IN THE FALL OF 1975 THAT THEY COULD NOT COMPETE WITH THE SOVIETS IN AN ANGOLAN ARMS RACE. THEY THEREFORE WITHDREW THEIR DIRECT ASSISTANCE

TO FNLA AND ASSUMED A STANCE OF PROMOTING AN AFRICAN SOLUTION TO AN AFRICAN PROBLEM. THE CHINESE SAW THIS AS THE BEST WAY TO REMAIN IN THE GOOD GRACES OF THEIR AFRICAN FRIENDS (SOME OF WHOM SUPPORTED THE MPLA), WHILE LETTING THE SOVIETS INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN A CIVIL WAR. SINCE THEN CHINA HAS PERSISTENTLY EXPLOITED EVERY AFRICAN FEAR OF THE SOVIET ROLE WITH THE INTENTION OF FORGING CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THOSE BLACK AFRICAN NATIONS MOST ALARMED BY THE INTERVENTION.

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44. THE MPLA'S RECOGNITION BY THE OAU AND AN INCREASING NUMBER OF NON-AFRICAN STATES HAS NOT RESULTED IN ANY ABATEMENT OF CHINA'S CRITICISM OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA, AND PEKING'S MOST VICIOUS BLAST AT MOSCOW CAME IN ITS REPLY TO BREZHNEV'S ADDRESS BEFORE THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS. ALTHOUGH IT MAY DELAY RECOGNITION OF LUANDA INDEFINITELY, PEKING HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO AVOID ANY DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE MPLA ITSELF, OR OF THE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE SUPPORTED IT. THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT CHINA'S STRIDENT PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IS BECOMING AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THOSE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE EITHER SUPPORTED OR ACCEPTED THE MPLA BUT NEVERTHELESS VALUE THEIR TIES WITH PEKING. ADDITIONALLY,

THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN QUICK TO RESPOND TO THE FEARS OF ANGOLA'S NEIGHBORS, PARTICULARLY ZAIRE:

--WHEN THE ZAIRIAN CITY OF DILOLO WAS BOMBARDED BY MPLA-CUBAN TROOPS, THE CHINESE GAVE THE EVENT WORLDWIDE COVERAGE AND MADE THE UNUSUAL EFFORT OF SENDING AN NCNA CORRESPONDENT TO THE SCENE. THE SUBSEQUENT REPORT NOTED NOT ONLY THE EFFECTS OF THE BOMBARDMENT,

BUT CHARGED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE REARMING 6,000 EX-KATANGA SECESSIONISTS TO "ATTACK ZAIRE."

--THE CHINESE APPARENTLY COMPLETED DELIVERY OF ARMS PROMISED TO ZAIRE LAST YEAR.

--A ZAIRIAN DELEGATION MADE A SPECIAL TRIP TO PEKING IN RECENT WEEKS AND MAY HAVE SIGNED A NEW PACT FOR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID.

45. THE PRC ALSO APPEARS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN ITS INFLUENCE IN OTHER AREAS OF AFRICA:

--IN ZAMBIA, CHINESE WORKERS ON THE NEW COMPLETED TAN-

ZAM RAILWAY HAVE BEEN SWITCHED TO NEW PROJECTS RATHER THAN WITHDRAWN.

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--IN TANZANIA, CHINESE INSTRUCTORS ARE CONTINUING TO TRAIN REGULAR ARMY AND PEOPLE'S DEFENSE UNITS, AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF STRAIN IN SINO-TANZANIAN RELATIONS RESULTING FROM DIFFERENCES OVER ANGOLA.

--IN MOZAMBIQUE, THE CHINESE HAVE EXTENDED ONE OF THE LARGEST FOREIGN CREDITS YET RECEIVED AND HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL PRESENT, ALTHOUGH THE ABSENCE OF THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR SINCE LAST NOVEMBER MAY REFLECT SOME TENSIONS IN THE RELATIONSHIP, POSSIBLY STEMMING FROM DIFFERENCES OVER ANGOLA.

--CHINESE ADVISORS ARE STILL THOUGHT TO BE TRAINING RHODESIAN GUERRILLAS IN TANZANIA, AND POSSIBLY IN MOZAMBIQUE AS WELL.

46. OVERALL, THE CHINESE HAVE TRIED TO MAKE THE MOST OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA GIVEN THEIR LIMITED RESOURCES. IT IS FAIR TO ASSUME THEY WILL MAINTAIN THEIR CURRENT AFRICAN POLICES AND AID LEVELS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ANY MAJOR DEPARTURES PROBABLY AWAIT A MORE SETTLED POLITICAL SCENE IN CHINA.

D. ROLE OF THE WEST

47. THE UNITED STATES PERCEIVED THE SOVIET UNION'S MASSIVE AND UNPRECEDENTED INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFRICA, WHERE THEY HAD NEVER HAD ANY HISTORIC INTERESTS, AS A MATTER OF URGENT CONCERN NOT ONLY TO THE NEIGHBORING

COUNTRIES DIRECTLY AFFECTED BUT TO THE WEST AS WELL, WHICH MUST BE CONCERNED WITH GLOBAL STABILITY. THEREFORE, BEGINNING IN JULY 1975, WE UNDERTOOK A PROGRAM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO FNLA/UNITA DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A LOCAL BALANCE OF FORCES THAT WOULD LEAD TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN AN AFRICAN CONTEXT AND TO IMPRESS ON THE USSR THAT THEIR ACTIONS WOULD BE MET BY A FIRM US RESPONSE.

48. OUR POLICY RECOGNIZED THE MPLA AS ONE OF THREE
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LEGITIMATE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND REALIZED A VIABLE SOLUTION WAS NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT THEIR PARTICIPATION. THE US, LIKE THE NINE, SOUGHT A:

--CEASE-FIRE;

--WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES--SOVIET, CUBAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN;

--CESSATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT;

--NEGOTIATION LEADING TO A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY.

WE HAD NO ILLUSION THAT A SETTLEMENT COULD EASILY BE REACHED AMONG THE GROUPS BUT, IN THE ABSENCE OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT, WE FELT THE AFRICAN STATES WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THE REPORT OF THE OAU CONCILIATION COMMISSION ON ANGOLA, WHICH ADVOCATED A BALANCED, NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.

49. ONCE FNLA AND UNITA HAD SUCCEEDED IN STABILIZING THE MILITARY SITUATION, PARTLY AS A RESULT OF OUR ASSISTANCE, AND AFTER PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES, THERE WAS SOME INDICATION IN DECEMBER THEY WERE REASSESSING THEIR POSITION. BEGINNING ON DECEMBER 9, THE SOVIET AIRLIFT TO ANGOLA CEASED AND DID NOT RECOMMENCE UNTIL SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE SENATE VOTED TO RESTRICT COVERT FUNDING FOR ANGOLA ON DECEMBER 19. ONCE THE SOVIETS PERCEIVED THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING OUR FRIENDS, HOWEVER, THEY HAD LITTLE MOTIVATION TO MODERATE THEIR CONDUCT.

50. DESPITE THIS ATMOSPHERE, THE WEST, BY CLOSE DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION IN THE WEEKS LEADING UP TO THE

JANUARY OAU SUMMIT, SUCCEEDED IN BOLSTERING THE RESOLVE OF MANY AFRICAN STATES TO FORGE A MODERATE GROUPING THAT WAS CAPABLE OF STANDING UP TO THE THREATS AND PRESSURE FROM THE RADICALS AND OTHER MPLA SUPPORTERS. THE WEST
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MUST CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE BENEFITS THAT CAN BE GAINED FROM THIS DEVELOPMENT, AND WE MUST UNEQUIVOCALLY DEMONSTRATE TO THESE STATES THAT THOSE WHO RISKED THE MOST TO RESIST SOVIET INTERVENTION ARE GIVEN A PROMPT, GENEROUS RESPONSE BY THE WEST AND EVIDENCE OF

SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF THE DANGER PRESENTED BY A
SOVIET-SUPPORTED ANGOLA.

IV. AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND THE CRISIS

A. REACTIONS OF AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES: ZAIRE, ZAMBIA, MOZAMBIQUE, AND TANZANIA

50. ZAIRE. HAVING FAILED TO PLACE THE FNLA IN POWER IN ANGOLA AND TO BRING CABINDA UNDER ZAIRIAN SUZERAINTY, PRESIDENT MOBUTU, WITH CHARACTERISTIC PRAGMATISM, HAS MOVED QUICKLY TO REPAIR RELATIONS WITH LUANDA. ZAIRE'S DEEPENING ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ITS VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK AND SUBVERSION FROM ANGOLA CONSTITUTED COMPELLING MOTIVES FOR MOBUTU'S CHANGE OF ATTITUDE. HIS MEETING WITH AGOSTINHO NETO IN BRAZZAVILLE ON FEBRUARY 28 CLIMAXED MORE THAN A MONTH OF PRIVATE OVERTURES ON BOTH SIDES.

51. IN EXCHANGE FOR NETO'S ASSURANCES THAT CUBAN AND EX-KATANGAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA WOULD NOT BE DIRECTED AGAINST ZAIRE AND THAT THE BENGUELA RAILROAD WOULD BE RE-OPENED TO ZAIRIAN TRADE, MOBUTU PROMISED TO SUSPEND HIS SUPPORT FOR FNLA, UNITA, AND FLEC (CABINDAN LIBERATION FRONT) INSURGENTS. PROGRESS TOWARD A COMPLETE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS IS EXPECTED TO CULMINATE IN FORMAL RECOGNITION AS SOON AS SOLUTIONS TO SPECIFIC PROBLEMS, E.G., THE REPATRIATION OF ANGOLAN REFUGEES AND THE REPAIR OF THE BENGUELA RAILROAD, HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

52. NONETHELESS, ANGOLAN-ZAIRIAN TENSIONS WILL CONTINUE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF MOBUTU'S CONCERN OVER THE POTENTIAL THREAT FROM THE SOVIET-CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA. MOBUTU IS UNLIKELY TO FORECLOSE ENTIRELY HIS OPTION OF SUPPORTING ANTI-MPLA DISSIDENTS; AND THE
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MPLA FOR ITS PART WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD IN RESERVE THE THREAT OF UNLEASHING EX-KATANGAN GENDARMES AND/OR CUBAN TROOPS AGAINST ZAIRE.

53. ZAMBIA. PRESIDENT KAUNDA HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER THE LIKELY EXTENSION OF SOVIET AND CUBAN INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT SOUTHERN AFRICA, WHICH HE FEARS WILL TRANSFORM THE CONFLICTS IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA INTO ARENAS FOR GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION, INCREASE THE PROSPECTS FOR VIOLENCE, AND CAUSE LONG-TERM INSTABILITY IN THE REGION FROM WHICH ZAMBIA COULD NOT HOPE TO ESCAPE. HE BLAMES ANGOLA'S THREE

LIBERATION GROUPS--THE MPLA IN PARTICULAR--FOR HAVING ALLOWED THEIR DISAGREEMENTS TO ESCALATE TO THE POINT WHERE THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS COULD ESTABLISH A FOOTHOLD IN THE REGION.

54. KAUNDA'S CONCERN OVER SOVIET-CUBAN INVOLVEMENT LED HIM INCREASINGLY TO SUPPORT UNITA AND ULTIMATELY TO CONDONE SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERVENTION. FOR THE SAME REASON, KAUNDA IS NOW REFUSING TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN NORMALIZING RELATIONS UNTIL THE MPLA ACCOMMODATES ITS RIVALS AND REDUCES THE SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE.

55. NEVERTHELESS, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALITIES WILL PROBABLY FORCE ZAMBIA TO ACCEPT THE MPLA. FALLING COPPER PRICES AND THE INABILITY TO EXPORT COPPER OVER THE BENGUELA RAILROAD SINCE LAST AUGUST COMBINED TO GIVE ZAMBIA AN ESTIMATED \$200 MILLION BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DEFICIT LAST YEAR. MOREOVER, ZAMBIA'S RELATIONS WITH MOZAMBIQUE AND TANZANIA--WHOSE PORTS AND RAILWAYS ARE NO LESS IMPORTANT TO ZAMBIA--HAVE ALREADY SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF DIFFERENCES OVER ANGOLA. MOBUTU'S AGREEMENT WITH NETO WILL PLACE ADDED PRESSURE ON KAUNDA TO FOLLOW SUIT, AND MPLA'S RECENT IMPOUNDMENT OF ZAMBIAN COPPER SHIPMENTS AT LOBITO SEEMS CALCULATED TO FORCE KAUNDA INTO RELENTING IN HIS OPPOSITION.

56. MOZAMBIQUE. AS ONE OF MPLA'S EARLIEST AND STAUNCHEST SUPPORTERS, MOZAMBIQUE HAS BEEN VINDICATED BY THE MPLA'S VICTORY. ALTHOUGH SAMORA MACHEL HAS OBVIOUSLY RULED

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OUT ANY IMMEDIATE ASSAULT--EITHER MILITARY OR ECONOMIC--AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, HE IS PROBABLY COMFORTED BY THE PRESENCE OF AN IDEOLOGICALLY SIMILAR ALLY ON SOUTH AFRICA'S WESTERN FLANK AND VIEWS THE MPLA SUCCESS AS PRESAGING THE EMERGENCE OF A SIMILARLY MINDED REGIME IN NAMIBIA.

57. MACHEL--WHO GENERALLY HAS BEEN WARY OF ALL OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN MOZAMBIQUE--HAS NOT BEEN ALTOGETHER UNCONCERNED BY THE EXTENT OF SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA. NEVERTHELESS, HE APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT NETO WILL SUCCEED IN PRESERVING HIS INDEPENDENCE AND WILL PURSUE AN INTERNATIONAL POLICY OF MILITANT NON-ALIGNMENT NOT UNLIKE HIS OWN.

58. AT THE SAME TIME, THE UNFLINCHING COMMITMENT OF MOSCOW AND HAVANA TO THE MPLA APPEARS TO HAVE INCREASED MACHEL'S APPRECIATION OF THE VALUE OF SOVIET AND CUBAN ASSISTANCE. AT A TIME WHEN ANGOLA HAS INTRODUCED

A DISCORDANT NOTE IN CHINA'S PREVIOUSLY PRIVILEGED RELATIONSHIP WITH FRELIMO, MACHEL SEEMS TO BE TURNING INCREASINGLY TO THE SOVIET BLOC FOR NEEDED ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. MOREOVER, MACHEL MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN PERSUADED BY THE ANGOLAN EXPERIENCE THAT

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MOSCOW AND HAVANA ARE MORE WILLING AND MORE ABLE TO ASSIST MOZAMBIQUE-BASED RHODESIAN INSURGENTS IN PREPARING FOR WHAT HE APPARENTLY REGARDS AS THE INEVITABLE ESCALATION OF THAT CONFLICT.

59. TANZANIA. IN HIS CONCERN OVER SOVIET-CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA, PRESIDENT NYERERE APPEARS TO FALL SOMEWHAT BETWEEN KAUNDA AND MACHEL. ALTHOUGH HE SUPPORTED THE MPLA, HE NEVERTHELESS HOPED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION THAT WOULD BRING THE RIVAL FACTIONS TOGETHER IN A MORE STABLE GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF ALL OUTSIDE POWERS. THIS HAVING FAILED, NYERERE NOW SEEMS TO BELIEVE THAT HIS INFLUENCE, AND THAT OF OTHER SIMILARLY CONCERNED AFRICAN LEADERS, WILL PROMPT THE CONFIDENTIAL

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MPLA TO MAINTAIN ITS AUTONOMY AND REDUCE ITS DEPENDENCE UPON MOSCOW AND HAVANA.

60. NYERERE CLEARLY VALUES HIS RELATIONS WITH THE CHINESE, WHOM HE REGARDS AS MORE TRUSTWORTHY BENEFACTORS IN AFRICA THAN THE SOVIETS, AND HE HAS ATTEMPTED TO MINIMIZE HIS DIFFERENCES WITH PEKING OVER ANGOLA. NEVERTHELESS, HE APPARENTLY IS CONCERNED THAT CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE REGION WILL DECLINE IN THE AFTERMATH OF ANGOLA, THEREBY REMOVING AN ADDITIONAL OBSTACLE TO THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET AND CUBAN INFLUENCE.

61. NYERERE HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CONVINCED THAT ACCEPTABLE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENTS IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA WILL NOT COME ABOUT WITHOUT THE ADDED PRESSURE OF INCREASED GUERRILLA WARFARE. TO THIS END HE PROBABLY IS WILLING TO COUNTENANCE INCREASED SOVIET AND CUBAN ASSISTANCE TO RHODESIAN AND NAMIBIAN INSURGENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE EVIDENTLY WANTS TO PREVENT MOSCOW AND HAVANA FROM PROFITING FROM THESE CONFLICTS AS THEY DID IN ANGOLA. HE WILL THEREFORE TRY TO FIND WAYS TO KEEP POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTROL OVER THE INSURGENTS IN AFRICAN HANDS TO THE GREATEST POSSIBLE EXTENT.

B. THE ATTITUDES OF OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES

62. THE ANGOLAN CRISIS PRODUCED THE DEEPEST DIVISION AMONG AFRICAN COUNTRIES SINCE THE CONGO (ZAIRE) CRISIS OF THE EARLY 1960S. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO ASSESS THE CONSEQUENCES, BUT IT APPEARS THAT IT HAS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED THE ATTITUDES OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES TOWARD THE GREAT POWERS, TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA, AND TOWARD THE FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

63. AT THE OUTSET, THERE WAS A FAIRLY WIDE SPECTRUM OF AFRICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS ANGOLA. IN BROAD TERMS THE DIVISION WAS BETWEEN "PROGRESSIVE" AND "MODERATE" REGIMES, BUT THE REALITY WAS MORE COMPLICATED. THE MPLA HAD A HARD CORE OF SUPPORTERS--E.G., ALGERIA, CONGO, GUINEA-BISSAU, CAPE VERDE, ETC. WHO RECOGNIZED LUANDA AT OR SHORTLY AFTER INDEPENDENCE. THE NATURAL
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ATTRACTION OF IDEOLOGICALLY SIMILAR REGIMES WAS REINFORCED, IN THE CASE OF THE FORMER PORTUGUESE DEPENDENCIES BY THE ASSOCIATIONS DATING FROM THE PERIOD OF THE INSURGENCIES AGAINST PORTUGAL.

64. AT THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM, FNLA AND UNITA HAD NO COMPARABLE SUPPORT--I.E., NO GOVERNMENTS RECOGNIZED THE HUAMBO REGIME. BUT A NUMBER OF STATES, APART FROM ZAIRE, GAVE SOME BACKING TO THE FNLA/UNITA COALITION--E.G., SENEGAL, CAMEROON, IVORY COAST, UGANDA, ETC. MOST AFRICAN STATES, HOWEVER, SOUGHT TO AVOID COMMITMENT, EITHER BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT THEIR NEUTRALITY WOULD SOMEHOW PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT OR BECAUSE THEY SIMPLY WISHED TO AWAIT A CLEAR WINNER.

65. AFTER NOVEMBER 11, THIS BROAD MIDDLE SPECTRUM WAS ERODED, AS STATES EITHER RECOGNIZED THE LUANDA REGIME OR IN EFFECT LINED UP ON THE OTHER SIDE BY SUPPORTING A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AND A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. AT THE OAU SUMMIT IN EARLY JANUARY, THE SPLIT WAS AN EVEN 22-22. THEREAFTER, THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND ACCELERATED RECOGNITIONS FOR THE LUANDA GOVERNMENT, AND SUPPORT FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION QUICKLY EVAPORATED. BY THE END OF FEBRUARY 1976, EVEN ZAIRE HAD MOVED TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH THE MPLA REGIME AND THERE WERE ONLY A HANDFUL OF HARDCORE HOLD-OUTS AGAINST LUANDA.

66. THE ATTITUDES AND EVENTS THAT SHAPED AFRICAN POSITIONS WERE DIVERSE ALTHOUGH SOMETIMES OVERLAPPING:

67. THE MPLA'S INITIAL ADVANTAGES. THE MPLA HAD THE INITIAL ADVANTAGE OF BEING WIDELY KNOWN AMONG AFRICAN

ELITES AND, DESPITE ITS NARROW BASE WITHIN ANGOLA, WAS ABLE TO PORTRAY ITSELF AS THE ONLY TRULY NATIONAL MOVEMENT. BY CONTRAST, ROBERTO WAS TARNISHED AS A "TRIBALIST" AND AS A "CREATURE" OF MOBUTU AND SAVIMBI WAS, AT THE OUTSET, HARDLY KNOWN AT ALL. AS A RESULT, THE MPLA HAD A PSYCHOLOGICAL EDGE THAT ITS OPPONENTS NEVER SUCCEEDED IN OVERCOMING.

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68. THE HOPE FOR A SOLUTION. AT THE OUTSET, PROBABLY MOST AFRICAN STATES HOPED THAT A SOLUTION WOULD EMERGE THAT WOULD PERMIT A SHARING OF POWER AND END THE CIVIL WAR. THIS ENCOURAGED A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS TO REMAIN MORE OR LESS UNCOMMITTED FOR A TIME. THEIR POSITION BECAME INCREASINGLY UNREALISTIC AS THE CONFLICT ESCALATED, AS THE PARTIES (ESPECIALLY MPLA) REMAINED INTRANSIGENT, AND AS IT BECAME CLEAR THAT NEITHER PORTUGAL NOR THE OAU COULD RECONCILE THE CONTENTENDERS. FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES THE HOPE HAD EVAPORATED BY THE TIME OF INDEPENDENCE, WHEN SOUTH AFRICAN AND SOVIET-CUBAN INTERVENTION HAD ESCALATED THE FIGHTING TO THE LEVEL OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE.

69. FEAR OF AN IMPOSED SETTLEMENT. CLOSELY RELATED TO THE ABOVE WAS THE FEAR THAT AN "IMPOSED" SOLUTION IN ANGOLA WOULD SOW THE SEEDS OF FUTURE DISCORD AND CREATE AN UNHEALTHY PRECEDENT FOR THE OAU ITSELF. THIS ATTITUDE WAS REINFORCED FOR MANY AFRICAN MODERATES BY THE SOVIET-CUBAN INTERVENTION AND LED MANY OF THESE COUNTRIES TO INSIST THAT THE OAU SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE THE LUANDA GOVERNMENT AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY IN ANGOLA.

70. THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS. THE SOVIET-CUBAN ROLE IN ANGOLA WAS PERHAPS THE STRONGEST INFLUENCE ON THE ATTITUDE OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES THAT OPPOSED RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA'S CLAIMS. "MODERATE" COUNTRIES--E.G., SENEGAL, IVORY COAST, LIBERIA, KENYA--WERE GENUINELY ALARMED BY THE UNPRECEDENTED INVOLVEMENT OF THE TWO COMMUNIST STATES AND DID NOT HESITATE TO EXPRESS CONCERN OVER THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR FUTURE SECURITY. IT IS LIKELY THAT THESE ATTITUDES HAVE PERSISTED DESPITE THE TRIUMPH OF THE MPLA AND THAT ONE RESULT OF THE ANGOLAN SITUATION HAS BEEN TO CREATE MORE UNEASINESS OVER SOVIET INTENTIONS THAN HAS EXISTED IN AFRICA FOR MORE THAN A DECADE.

71. THE SOUTH AFRICAN ROLE. FOR OTHER AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS (E.G., NIGERIA GHANA, SUDAN), SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT OF FNLA/UNITA FAR OUTWEIGHED THE ACTIVE SOVIET-CUBAN ROLE.

THE ENTRANCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS INTO THE CONFLICT--
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WHOSE PRESENCE BECAME WIDELY KNOWN IN THE LATTER PART OF NOVEMBER--WAS THE TURNING POINT FOR A NUMBER OF AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS. THEY REGARDED THE OPERATION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY FORCES BEYOND IT'S BORDERS AS FAR MORE MENACING THAN THE SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE. FOR THESE COUNTRIES ALSO, THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONNECTION STRIPPED FNLA AND UNITA OF ANY CLAIM TO LEGITIMACY.

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72. EVEN SO, THERE APPEARS TO BE AN UNDERCURRENT OF UNEASINESS EVEN AMONG SOME COUNTRIES THAT SUPPORTED LUANDA AND DEFENDED THE SOVIET ROLE. EITHER GENUINELY OR AS A RATIONALIZATION, A NUMBER OF AFRICAN LEADERS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE MPLA IS INTENDED IN PART TO CURTAIL ITS DEPENDENCE UPON MOSCOW AND HAVANA.

73. THE DESIRE TO BE ON THE WINNING SIDE. FINALLY, FOR MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES, THERE WAS SIMPLY A CONCERN TO BE ON THE WINNING SIDE. AS THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND BEGAN TO CHANGE DRAMATICALLY IN JANUARY, ONE COUNTRY AFTER ANOTHER BEGAN TO OPT FOR LUANDA, IN AN EFFORT NOT TO BE CAUGHT IN THE COMPANY OF THE LOSERS.

C. OAU EFFORTS AT CONCILIATION

74. THE OAU'S EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WERE CONSISTENTLY INEFFECTUAL. THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE PARTIES, THE DEEPENING DIVISIONS AMONG AFRICAN COUNTRIES, AND THE ESCALATION AND POLARIZATION OF THE SITUATION WITHIN ANGOLA ITSELF, ALL MADE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR ANY OUTSIDE MEDIATOR TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION. OAU CHAIRMAN AMIN WAS UNABLE TO PLAY AN EFFECTIVE ROLE, IN PART BECAUSE HE WAS WIDELY DISTRUSTED, AND DIVISIONS AMONG SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE OAU SECRETARIAT MAY ALSO HAVE PLAYED A ROLE.

75. THE OAU CONCILIATION COMMISSION ESTABLISHED BY THE KAMPALA SUMMIT PRESENTED IN OCTOBER A PEACE PROPOSAL
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BASED ON A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN MERCENARIES, AND A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION. AMIN CONVENED THE OAU "BUREAU" (THE VICE PRESIDENTS ELECTED AT THE KAMPALA SUMMIT) TO ENDORSE THE PLAN AT THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER, BUT NOTHING CAME OF THIS MOVE (IN PART PERHAPS BECAUSE THE BUREAU INCLUDED A NUMBER OF STRONG MPLA PARTISANS). IN ANY CASE, THIS REPRESENTED THE FIRST AND LAST ATTEMPT BY THE OAU TO MEDIATE SETTLEMENT. THEREAFTER, IT BECAME INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE OAU SUMMIT WOULD SIMPLY BE A REFERENDUM ON RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA, AND THE DEADLOCK THAT IT PRODUCED DID LITTLE MORE THAN SIGNAL THE DEPTH OF THE SPLIT. THE ONLY SUBSEQUENT OAU INVOLVEMENT OCCURRED AFTER THE LANDSLIDE OF JANUARY-FEBRUARY RECOGNITIONS HAD PRODUCED A LOPSIDED MAJORITY FOR THE MPLA, WHICH WAS RATIFIED BY THE SEATING OF THE LUANDA GOVERNMENT AT THE OAU FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING AT ADDIS ABABA IN LATE FEBRUARY.

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76. IT IS PREMATURE AT THIS POINT TO DRAW ANY FIRM CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE OAU'S INABILITY TO COPE WITH THE ANGOLAN CRISIS, SINCE THE SITUATION WAS UNIQUE IN THE ORGANIZATION'S HISTORY. AT THE SAME TIME, IT EXPOSED SERIOUS INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES IN THE OAU'S ABILITY TO PROMOTE CONSENSUS AND PLAY AN EFFECTIVE ROLE WHEN THE MEMBER STATES THEMSELVES ARE DEEPLY DIVIDED.

V. THE SITUATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

77. POLITICAL TENSIONS HAVE SHARPLY INCREASED IN THE HORN OF AFRICA IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS. THE MOGADISCIO REGIME HAS EMBARKED ON AN AGGRESSIVE POLICY IN AN ATTEMPT TO BRING THE SOMALI-INHABITED REGIONS, THE FTAI (FRENCH TERRITORY OF THE AFARS AND ISSAS) UNDER THE SOMALI FLAG. THE RECENT RENEWAL OF SOMALI-SUPPORTED INSURGENCIES IN ETHIOPIA'S BORDER PROVINCES IS AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT THE CURRENT WEAKNESS OF THE ETHIOPIAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO DISTRACT THAT GOVERNMENT FROM OPPOSING SOMALI DESIGNS ON DJIBOUTI, AND EVENTUALLY TO YIELD THE EASTERN AREAS OCCUPIED BY NOMADIC SOMALI TRIBES. IN THE FTAI, THE FRENCH DECISION TO GRANT

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INDEPENDENCE WITHIN THE NEXT TWO YEARS HAS ENCOURAGED MOGADISCIO TO LAUNCH A CAMPAIGN OF POLITICAL SUBVERSION AND VIOLENCE DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT INDEPENDENCE UNDER A PRO-SOMALI GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD EVENTUALLY CHOOSE UNION WITH SOMALI. ETHIOPIA, WHICH IS DETERMINED TO PROTECT ITS ACCESS TO THE ONLY RAILROAD FROM ADDIS ABABA TO THE SEA, WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY FIGHT TO PREVENT A

SOMALI TAKEOVER OF THE FTAL.

78. THE SOVIETS MUST CATER TO THE MOGADISCIO GOVERNMENT'S OBSESSION WITH ITS IRREDENTIST CLAIMS TO PROTECT THEIR POSITION IN SOMALIA. BUT WE BELIEVE MOSCOW DOES NOT AT THIS TIME WANT A WAR IN THE HORN AND WOULD DISCOURAGE THE SOMALIS FROM INITIATING OPEN HOSTILITIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE SOMALIS COULD REDEEM THEIR LOST TERRITORIES THROUGH SUBVERSION WITHOUT PROVOKING A WAR, MOSCOW WOULD PROBABLY DO NOTHING TO DETER THEM. IF WAR DID BREAK OUT, THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY BACK THE SOMALIS WHILE SEEKING A POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT.

79. THE USSR CONTINUES TO DEVELOP BERBERA AS ITS MAJOR INDIAN OCEAN SUPPORT BASE. A SOVIET-BUILT FLOATING DRYDOCK, DELIVERED TO BERBERA IN DECEMBER, WILL INCREASE SOVIET CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN SHIPS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN FOR EXTENDED PERIODS. CONSTRUCTION IS CONTINUING ON A

MISSILE HANDLING AND STORAGE FACILITY AND A NEW AIRFIELD. AT LEAST 30 STYX MISSILES AND TWO OSA-II PATROL BOATS HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO BERBERA. THEY ARE PROBABLY INTENDED FOR THE SOMALI NAVY, AND SOMALI NAVAL PERSONNEL HAVE GONE TO THE USSR FOR TRAINING.

80. ETHIOPIA'S RULING PROVISIONAL MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL CONTINUES TO PURSUE ITS GOAL OF A RADICAL RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIETY. THE FORCED PACE OF CHANGE-- INVOLVING THE DECLARATION OF ETHIOPIAN SOCIALISM, THE NATIONALIZATION OF MOST OF THE MODERN ECONOMY, AND LAND REFORM--HAS ALIENATED BOTH ELITES AND PEASANTS. REBELLIONS ARE GOING ON IN ALL OF THE COUNTRY'S PROVINCES, AND SOME REGIONS ARE COMPLETELY OUTSIDE CENTRAL
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GOVERNMENT CONTROL. EFFORTS TO PUT DOWN THESE REVOLTS, TO COMBAT THE LONG-STANDING INSURGENCY IN ERITREA, AND TO GUARD THE BORDERS AGAINST SOMALIA HAVE BADLY STRAINED MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

81. THE ETHIOPIANS CONTINUE TO DEPEND ON THE US AS THEIR MAIN ARMS SUPPLIER. BUT THEIR SENSE OF MILITARY VULNERABILITY VIS-A-VIS THEIR NEIGHBORS HAS LED THEM TO LOOK FOR OTHER SOURCES OF ARMS. SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE INTEREST ON THE PART OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. DESPITE SOVIET INTEREST IN EXPANDING TIES WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME IN ADDIS ABABA, MOSCOW'S IMPORTANT STAKE IN ITS SOMALI MILITARY FACILITIES WOULD PRECLUDE ANY LARGE SCALE ARMS OFFER. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT THE

SOVIETS MIGHT GIVE THE ETHIOPIANS A MODEST AMOUNT OF
MILITARY AID ALONG WITH THE ECONOMIC AID IT ALREADY
PROVIDES.

82. THE PRC HAS CONTINUED THE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS NEGOTIATED BY THE HAILE SELASSIE GOVERNMENT,
BUT IT HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN PROVIDING MILITARY
AID. THE CHINESE MAY BE RELUCTANT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN
A REGIONAL ARMS RACE WITH THE SOVIETS THAT THEY CANNOT
WIN AND THAT IS FAR FROM THEIR BORDER. KISSINGER
UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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